[Nix-dev] Binary trust

[Kirill Elagin]

That’s not cool at all.

An easy way would be to force TLS.
Another option could be to sign NARs with a certificate tied to the
hostname of the trusted binary cache and issued by a special NixOS/Nixpkgs
CA.

On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 11:30 PM Peter Simons <simons at cryp.to> wrote:

> Hi Kirill,
>
>  > Actually, that’s an interesting question. I always assumed they were
>  > signed (AFAIK `nix-store` is able to check signatures contained inside
>  > NAR-files), but now I wonder how does hydra.cryp.to sign NAR’s…
>
> it's my understanding that the content from binary caches is not signed in
> any meaningful way. If you're downloading pre-compiled binaries from
> hydra.cryp.to or anywhere else, then you're living in the Wild West,
> essentially. Anyone with the ability to mess with those machines (or the
> transport layer between you and the cache) can inject trojan horses into
> your system as they please.
>
> Best regards,
> Peter
>
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